Cases Noted by , Case Western Reserve University Law Review
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 2
1969
Cases Noted
Case Western Reserve University Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation





CONTROL, REGULATION, AND USE - LIABILITIES OF MANUFACTURERS
- Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).- Plaintiff
was injured in a head-on collision in which his car was struck in the left
front. The solid piece steering assembly was pushed rearward into plain-
tiff's head. In finding that the design of the steering assembly was danger-
ous to the driver, and that the manufacturer was liable for the injury, the
court held that although the intended use of a car was not to have accidents,
the possibility of an accident should be considered by the manufacturer, and
the car designed to minimize the risk of injury.
The decision reaffirms the majority rule that a product should be safe
enough to meet any situation which could reasonably be foreseen in the
product's normal environment.
BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER X REORGANIZATION - SEC PARTICIPATION IN INVESTIGATION
UNDER SECTION 167 OF BANKRUPTCY ACT - In Re Commonwealth Finan-
cial Corp., 288 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1968).- Petitioner challenged the
SEC's right to participate in an investigation under section 167 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1964). The court held that it was authorized
to permit SEC participation under certain circumstances in a chapter X reor-
ganization. Examining the act, the court pointed out that although SEC
participation is not expressly authorized, the trustees may, with court
approval, employ individuals deemed necessary to assist in an investigation
and that under section 208 of the act, the SEC, again with the approval of
the court, may proceed as a party in interest "with a right to be heard in all
matters."
The decision is consistent with the policy of an involved and cooperative
working effort between the SEC and the bankruptcy courts.
CIvI RIGHTS
PUBLIC ACCOMODATIONS - GENERAL - Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d
96 (4th Cir. 1968).- Defendant YMCA was operated in a building com-
plex consisting of two structures connected by a breezeway. One building
contained dining and lodging accommodations and the other athletic facili-
ties. Plaintiff, a Negro, was denied the use of the latter. A federal dis-
trict court held that the athletic facilities of the YMCA were not covered by
section 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964),
because they were separate and distinct from the dining and lodging areas.
The court of appeals in a split decision reversed, holding that all of the
YMCA facilities were a single establishment covered by the act. There-
fore, racial discrimination in purveying any of its facilities was forbidden.
This decision extends the meaning of "public accommodation" under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include facilities not only physically within
the premises of a public accommodation but also those that are physically, ad-
ministratively, financially, and conceptually connected.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PERSONAL, CIVIL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS - RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
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FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE - Mayock v. Martin, ___ Conn.----, 245 A.2d
574 (1968).- Plaintiff, a mental patient in a state hospital, contended that
his confinement constituted a violation of his first amendment guarantees
by discriminating against his religious beliefs. Plaintiff's prior history re-
vealed that in response to religious feelings he had severed his right arm,
put out his right eye, and admittedly was willing to cut off his right foot
either as a free-will offering or in response to a revelation. The trial court
found the plaintiff's bizarre conduct inconsistent with the peace and safety
of the state.
In affirming, the supreme court followed the interpretation of the reli-
gious clauses of the first amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); that while the freedom to believe and to adopt a chosen form
of religion is an absolute right, the freedom to act in accordance with one's
religious beliefs necessarily remains subject to regulation for the protection
and welfare of society.
PROCEDURE - SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT - State v. Forcella, .... N.J.
245 A.2d 181 (1968).- Defendant alleged the New Jersey homi-
cide statutes, which permit the imposition of the death penalty upon all
murder defendants except those pleading guilty, abridged his right against
self-incrimination and his right to a jury trial by improperly inducing him to
waive those rights and plead guilty. In upholding these statutes, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey stressed both the desirability of giving considera-
tion to those admitting their guilt and the humanity of not requiring all
murder defendants to face death. The court reasoned that an individual
indicted for murder under these statutes, in effect, risks his life by pleading
not guilty. This decision is in conflict with the trend established by the
Supreme Court decisions to invalidate legislation which makes the exercise
of a constitutional right costly or unnecessarily burdensome.
COPYRIGHT
MOTION PICTURES - CATV SYSTEMS - Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).- Petitioner operated a CATV
system which received broadcast signals of five television stations and trans-
mitted them to its customers by cable. Respondent licensed these stations to
broadcast its motion pictures. Respondent sought damages and injunctive
relief, claiming infringement of its right of performance under the Copy-
right Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § I(c)-(d) (1964). The Supreme Court held
that a CATV system which transmits program signals originally broadcast
under license and which did not itself originate programs was not a "per-
former" and thus petitioner was not in violation of the act.
The Court applied a functional test in determining whether a transmis-
sion is a "performance" under the act. It viewed the CATV system's
function as analogous to that of a cooperative antenna rather than that of
a broadcaster. The Court refused to extend its holding in Buck v. Jewell-
LaSalle Realty, 283 U.S. 191 (1931), which concerned retransmission of
radio broadcasts.
CRIMINAL LAW
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - BAR TO PROSECUTION - Akron v. Akins, 15
Ohio App. 2d 168, 239 N.E.2d 430 (1968).- In 1967 the defendant
was charged with failing to file a 1963 municipal income tax return. He
CASES NOTED
pleaded guilty, and a continuance was obtained to allow him to pay the tax.
Subsequently, Smith v. Akron, 14 Ohio St. 2d 247, 237 N.E.2d 396 (1968),
established a statute of limitations of 1 year for such offenses. The de-
fendant sought to change his plea to not guilty in order to attack the trial
court's jurisdiction. The trial judge refused to vacate the guilty plea and
sentenced the defendant. The appellate court reversed on the ground that
the running of the statute of limitations caused the lower court to loose its
jurisdiction over the matter.
The decision darifies the purpose of the statute of limitations in Ohio
criminal actions. Its expiration grants immunity from prosecution and can-
not be waived by a guilty plea.
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY - ADVERSE PARTY'S CASE, MATTER RELAT-
ING TO - United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).- In
a condemnation proceeding, defendant landowner sought discovery of the
federal government's expert witnesses' opinions relating to the value of the
property in issue. The government requested a broad protective order which
would have virtually precluded all such inquiry by the defendant, but the
distirct court denied the motion. When the government's witnesses refused
to answer questions or produce documents (at the discovery proceeding) that
would have been barred by the proposed protective order, the court dismissed
the government action.
In affirming the lower court's order to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals supported the current trend toward requiring full pretrial dis-
closure of expert appraisers' opinions in condemnation proceedings. The
court rejected arguments that sought to bring expert information and
opinions within the protective folds of the "attorney's work product" doc-
trine of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and lent its support to
the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for the United States District Courts, 43 F.R.D. 211 (1967), which
specifically authorizes such discovery.
PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF WRITINGS AND OF OTHER MATTERS -
PRIVILEGE OF PARTY AS WITNESS - Freeman v. Seligson, 37 U.S.L.W. 2022
(D.C. Cir. June 28, 1968).- The Secretary of Agriculture refused to com-
ply with a bankruptcy trustee's subpoena duces tecum arguing that since sec-
tion 8 of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 12 (Supp. 1967), pro-
hibited him from publishing trade secrets, business transactions, or customer
names, he was privileged to refuse compliance. Directing the Secretary to
comply, the court held that section 8 did not indicate congressional concern
over disclosure in judicial proceedings but only widespread dissemination of
private information. The decision illustrates the great importance accorded
the discovery procedure by the federal courts and reaffirms the rule that
discovery devices should not be thwarted by conflicting statutes, at least
where the intent of Congress is unclear.
REMOVAL - FRAUDULENT JOINDER - Howard v. General Motors Corp.,
287 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Miss. 1968).- Plaintiff, the buyer of a truck
without a collapsible steering assembly, initiated a personal injury action
against the out-of-state manufacturer, General Motors, and joined the resi-
dent car dealer. General Motors claimed that the joinder of the dealer,
which destroyed the diversity necessary for the manufacturer's removal to
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the federal court system, was fraudulent. The court held that the law of
Mississippi tended toward strict liability for retailers as well as manufac-
turers, therefore, the joinder was not fraudulent.
In remanding, the court followed the prevailing rule in the fifth circuit,
that there is no fraudulent joinder unless it is dear that the plaintiff cannot
recover from the joined defendant under state law on the alleged cause of
action, as was held in Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474 (5th
Cir. 1962).
HUSBAND AND WIFE
DIVORCE - TORT LIABILITY - Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645
(N.D. Fla. 1968).- Plaintiff sued her former husband for the wrongful
death of her minor child which occurred prior to the plaintiff and de-
fendant's marriage. The district court held that the divorced wife could
not maintain the suit even though the tort was committed prior to their
marriage. The court reasoned that the common law doctrine of the unity
of husband and wife as one person during coverture extinguished any right
of action which the wife had against her spouse and that the parties' sub-
sequent divorce did not revive such right. Although the particular question
had not previously been before the Florida courts, the decision was a logical
extension of existing Florida law. The court remarked that any change in
this area of the law would have to come "clearly and unequivocally" from
the legislature.
INTERNAL REVENUE
DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS - INTEREST - Plastic Toys, Inc., P-H TAX CT.
REP. & MEM. DEC. (1968 P-H Tax Ct. Memo) 5 68, 143 (Aug. 8, 1968).
- Petitioners were successors to a partnership that transferred its assets
and liabilities to two corporations. In consideration, petitioners issued
stock, mortgage bonds, and debentures to each of the two former partners.
The mortgage bonds and debentures were later transferred to each partner's
wife as trustee for the benefit of their respective children. The Commis-
sioner disallowed petitioners' deductions for interest paid on the debt obliga-
tions. In reversing, the Tax Court noted the existence of a realistic creditor-
debtor relationship and held that procedures followed in the issuance, trans-
fer, and recording of the bonds, and provisions contained in the instruments
were valid indications of a bona fide indebtedness and, therefore, payments
were deductible in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The Tax Court, in so holding, continued the policy of deciding debt-
equity issues upon the specific facts of each case.
LABOR RELATIONS
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY - DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX - Dodd v.
American Airlines, Inc., 37 U.S.L.W. 2133 (EEOC June 20, 1968).- Re-
spondent imposed a maximum age restriction of 33 years on its steward-
esses. Plaintiff had declined to accept reassignment to nonflight employ-
ment at age 33 and was subsequently discharged from defendant's employ-
ment. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), after
considering the past and current practices and policies of the airline indus-
try and the respondent's failure to apply the same restriction to its male
flight personnel, found the age restriction was not related to satisfactory job
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performance, but rather to the sexual identity of the individual. Conse-
quently, the sex-based condition of employment was held violative of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e) (Supp. 1967).
This decision is consistent with the conclusions previously reached by
the Departments of Labor and Defense, and follows recent decisions of the
EEOC banning sex discrimination in the airline industry.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES - PROHIBITING UNION ACTIVITY - Darlington
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968).- Milliken, the majority
stockholder in two textile mills, gained control of 66 percent of Darlington
Manufacturing stock. Darlington embarked upon a $400,000 capital im-
provements program during the first 9 months of 1956; however, 1 month
before its employees joined a union, the Darlington treasurer projected a loss
of $40,000 for the current year and a $240,000 loss for the following year.
The court of appeals affirmed the NLRB finding that a subsequent deci-
sion to dose Darlington was not based on economic factors, but was a single
employer's attempt to chill unionism at the other two mills.
The general rule in this area requires that there be valid and honest
economic reasons for a shutdown. The trend toward judicial discretion has
been strengthened by this court which, according to the dissent, has sub-
stituted its own economic judgment for that of the Darlington directors.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
LANDLORD's LIABILITY FOR TENANT'S INJURY - KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECT
- Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, __ Pa. , 243 A.2d 395 (1968).- In this
case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the dismissal of the tenants'
complaint in trespass against their landlord and held that a landlord is
liable in tort for physical harm caused to his tenant by a dangerous condi-
tion on the leased premises which existed when the written lease was exe-
cuted, and which the landlord orally promised to repair both prior and sub-
sequent to the execution of the written lease.
The court, finding that modem housing shortages contribute to unequal
landlord and tenant bargaining positions, overruled previous case law and
placed Pennsylvania in the small but growing number of jurisdictions which
are equalizing the legal obligations of landlord and tenant by placing respon-
sibility on the landlord for injury resulting from the condition of the
premises.
LIBEL AND SLANDER
PRIVILEGE - PUBLIC OFFICIAL - Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Pub-
lishing Corp., - Ill. 2d ___, 239 N.E.2d 837 (1968).- Plaintiff, an Illi-
nois patrolman, brought suit to recover damages suffered from allegedly de-
famatory falsehoods made by defendant. The patrolman's main contention
was that, as a patrolman, he was "the lowest rank of police official," and this
status placed him outside the catagory of "public official" as defined in New
York Times Co. v. Sulivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), thus, he would not have
to prove actual malice as required by the Times decision in order to recover.
However, due to his function as a law enforcement officer and the potential-
ities for social harm inherent in the abuse of such a position, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that his status was within the meaning of the New York
Times Co. definition of "public official." Therefore, a police patrolman,
like other public officials, must show actual malice in order to recover
under state libel laws.
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This case is in accord with the prevailing view that, due to the unique
social position of public officials, actual malice must be alleged and proved
in order for the official to recover in a libel action, and extends the New
York Times Co. definition of "public official" to include even "the lowest
rank of police officials."
MOTOR VEHICLES
CONTROL, REGULATION, AND USE - POWER TO REGULATE - Common-
wealth v. Howie ____. Mass. 238 N.E.2d 373 (1968).- Defendant
was prosecuted for failing to wear protective headgear while operating a
motorcycle. Upon appeal, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction on the
theory that such an exercise of police power is necessary for the health and
welfare of Massachusetts' citizens.
This Massachusetts decision along with a similar one in Rhode Island
are the first decisions handed down by state supreme courts determining
the validity of recent headgear statutes enacted in a number of states.
Lower courts in other states, particularly New York, have upheld these stat-
utes. The only court to attack the validity of the headgear requirement is
the Court of Appeals of Michigan which held in a recent decision that the
requirement bore no relationship to the state's police powers. Neverthe-
less, the weight of recent judicial decision is in support of statutes requir-
ing headgear.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
WATER SUPPLY - DUTY OF DEVELOPER TO PAY COST OF ONSITE WATER
MAINS - Crownhill Homes Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 433 S.W.2d
448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).- Plaintiff, a subdivider and developer of
property within the city limits of San Antonio, protested a city regulation
requiring him to donate his onsite water mains to the city in order to obtain
water service. The court, by a majority of 2 to 1, held that since a large
part of the expense of furnishing water to a subdivider was in the "back-up"
facilities, the city's regulation was a reasonable exercise of its governmental
discretion and not an unlawful taking of private property without compen-
sation. The majority relied on the many cases which have upheld the dis-
cretion of a municipality in refusing to extend water mains; however, other
jurisdictions not mentioned by the court have distinguished regulations re-
quiring a developer to pay the costs of such extention as an abuse of gov-
ernmental powers.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LIABILITIES TO PERSONS PURCHASING OR USING ARTICLES SOLD OR Dis-
PENSED - PRIVITY - Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).- Plaintiff sued a drug manufacturer for breach of war-
ranty when his son was injured after being innoculated with Quadrigen, a
drug which the defendant had sold to the physician. The evidence showed
that the drug was defective and was the proximate cause of the injury. In
holding the defendant liable for breach of implied warranty the court ob-
served that the requirement of privity had recently been dealt some crushing
blows by the New York Court of Appeals and was not a bar to recovery.
The court also indicated that the necessity of a sale to impose warranty lia-
CASES NOTED
bility was satisfied by the sale of the drug to the doctor. This decision is
in accord with the growing number of decisions rejecting the doctrine of
privity in the area of products liability.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTEREST - NECESSITY OF FILING - Levine
v. Pascal, 94 IMl. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425 (1968).- Respondents,
who were assignees of a beneficial interest in a land trust as security for a
loan, claimed that their interest was in real property and therefore not gov-
erned by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Alternatively, respond-
ents claimed that by recording the assignment with the land trustee they had
perfected their security interest without filing under section 9-302 of the
UCC. The court held that the interest was a "general intangible" which,
pursuant to section 9-302, could only be perfected by meeting the filing re-
quirements established in section 9-401.
In so holding, the court affirmed the rule adopted by other jurisdictions
under the UCC that the burden of proof was on the holder of an unper-
fected security interest to show that the judgment creditor had knowledge
of the interest when the latter obtained his lien. However, the court's use
of a relatively peculiar Illinois common law rule in determining the appli-
cability of the UCC appears inconsistent with the goal of uniformity there-
under.
SECURITIES
INVESTMENT COMPANIES - REGISTRATION UNDER THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT - SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).- Defendant corporation possessed liquid resources which
it was using to purchase stock from other companies. The SEC alleged that
defendant had failed to register as an investment company under the Invest-
ment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) (1) (1964). The court held that
the corporation became an investment company under the act when its
other business activities became negligible compared to its large purchases of
securities. The court further held that the sale of corporation stock by an
officer, without director approval, constituted fraud under the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1964), and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964).
In so holding, the court established judicial criteria for determining the
status of an investment company, as well as continuing the trend in expand-
ing the meaning of fraud in the sale of securities.
RULE 10B-5 - IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION - Jordan Building Corp. v.
Doyle, O'Connor & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,256 (7th Cir. Aug.
14, 1968).- Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant stockbrokers for
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and nondisclosure of material facts
which induced plaintiffs to buy convertible debentures. The court of ap-
peals reversed the interlocutory order of the district court and held that a
civil remedy exists under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(r) (1964), and rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1967). In holding that a civil rem-
edy is implied under rule lob-5 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit has joined the increasing number of circuits providing investor protec-
tion against the fraudulent sale or purchase of securities.
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TAXATION
FRANCHISE TAX - PROPER OCCASION - Cooper-Jarrett v. Porterfield, 15
Ohio St. 2d 54, 238 N.E.2d 554 (1968).- Appellant, who conducted a
purely interstate trucking business in Ohio, was assessed a franchise tax for
the years 1961-1964, which it refused to pay. The assessment was based
upon the company's own estimate of the tax. The appellant's sole conten-
tion was that the state restricted its federally granted right to engage in in-
terstate business by exacting such a tax. The Ohio Supreme Court held that
the tax was nondiscriminatory and reasonable and, as such, did not restrict
appellant's constitutional rights.
The decision affirms the rule stated by the Supreme Court in North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959),
and reemphasizes the need for precision in choosing "precedent" in an area
of law where there are many tenuous distinctions.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEVISION AND RADIO - POWERS OF OFFICERS, COMMISSIONS AND
AGENCIES - Black Hills Video Corp. v. Federal Communication Comm'n,
399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).- Black Hills Video Corporation was owner
and operator of a microwave television system serving affiliate and coplain-
tiff Midwest Video Corporation at Rapid City, South Dakota. In its first
report and order the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) sought
to regulate community antenna television systems (CATV) employing mi-
crowave transmission, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965). Petitioner asserted that
the FCC lacked the necessary statutory authority to regulate CATV micro-
wave systems. Expanding the recent Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the court held that
the Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), conferred juris-
diction upon the FCC to regulate microwave as well as off the air CATV
systems. The growing complexity of technology in an expanding eco-
nomic system has induced Congress to invest broad powers in specialized
agencies. As was the case here, the federal courts have been loath to inter-
fere when the regulations are reconcilable with statutory directions.
WORKMENS COMPENSATION
DEATH BENEFITS - SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT - Wheatley v. Adler, 36
U.S.L.W. 2738 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1968).- While urinating behind the
shop on a cold morning, a lame truck mechanic collapsed and died. Appel-
lants brought an action to obtain workmen's compensation death payments.
The lower court ruled that the connection between the injury and the de-
ceased's job was insufficient to warrant a judgment in the appellant's favor.
On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that the death arose out of and
during the course of decedant's employment, and arguing that the deceased
had not chosen an abnormal means of relieving himself. The decision indi-
cates the continuing trend to grant awards in arguable cases, placing the bur-
den upon the employer to show that the injury arose beyond the scope of
the employee's work.
PARTICULAR EMPLOYMENT - LONGSHORE WORK - Marine Stevedoring
Co. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).- Four longshoremen were
injured or killed while working on a pier. Three fell on the dock, but one
fell into the water. The appellee contended that the Longshoremen's and
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Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964), applied
to the longshoreman who drowned, but not to those injured on the dock on
the theory that such injuries are not "upon the navigable waters of the
United States" within the meaning of the act. The court of appeals held
that the injuries of all four were embraced by the act.
In reaching its conclusion the court rejected the traditional view that
piers are extensions of the land, and took the more liberal position that
Congress intended the benefits of the act to apply to all longshoremen in-
jured in the course of their employment, regardless of where the injury
occurred.
